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1. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing literature suggesting that economists are more likely than
others to act self-interestedly, and less likely to behave cooperatively. For
example, Carter & Irons (1991) compared the behavior of economics and non-
economics undergraduates in a simple ultimatum bargaining game. This is a
two-person game in which one person (the proposer) suggests a division of
$10 between him/herself and a second person (the Responder). Carter & Irons
found that economics students proposed smaller amounts to the responder
than did non-economics students. In a follow-up study, Frank, Gilovich and
Regan (1993) compared the behavior of economics and non-economics
undergraduates in a prisoner’s dilemma game. In this game, acting self-
interestedly may lead to a higher monetary payoff or to a lower reward than
would be the case if both players cooperate. In their experiment, Frank,
Gilovich & Regan found that economics students were far more likely to
behave self-interestedly (and uncooperatively) than were non-economics
majors.
Results such as these have been interpreted as illustrating the way in which a
particular model of rationality is inculcated in economics programs.
Introductory microeconomics begins with the assumption that individuals seek
to maximize their "satisfaction", or "welfare". Similarly, firms act so as to
maximize their profits. These are presented as positive, rather than normative,
statements that are helpful in understanding economic behavior. Furthermore,
the existence of competitive markets, Adam Smith’s "invisible hand", ensures
that these self-interested behaviours maximize the economic well-being of
society. While this simple model is frequently modified in more advanced
courses, "from the perspective of many economists, motives other than self-
interest are peripheral to the main thrust of human endeavour, and we indulge
them at our peril" (Frank, Gilovich & Regan, 1993: 159).
Acceptance of this economics perspective, and the higher level of self-interest
apparently shown by economics students, does not answer the following
question posed by some researchers: Does economics teach self-interested
behaviour, or does it attract students who are already predisposed to such
behaviour? Researchers have asked, for example, "whether exposure to the
self-interest model commonly used in economics alters the extent to which
people behave in self-interested ways" (Frank, Gilovich & Regan, 1993: 159).
There is, as yet, no consensus on the answer to this question.
In a broader context, Frank & Cook (1995) have argued that the competitive
values promoted by at least some economists may have led to a cultural
preoccupation with a "winner take all" strategy. Using the contemporary United
States as the primary example, Frank & Cook (1995) show how the growing
inequality between rich and poor may be partially the result of the widespread
acceptance of the view that competition is rational and that sharing is for fools.
Widespread exposure to the self-interest model may lead many or even most
members of an entire culture to "reach a point where suddenly things seem to
fall into place and one no longer feels lost and overwhelmed by what is going
on … [O]ne finally sees how it all fits together" (Pinto, 1998, p. 4). The "winner
take all" model may be just such a coherent frame of reference that enables
individuals to justify selfish behavior as rational.
Of course, one must not exaggerate the extent to which the self-interest model
dominates public discourse. Other disciplines, as well as some economists,
appear to promote values that are sharply at variance with the self-interest
model. Take psychology, for instance, in which individual differences in "social
value orientation" have long been the subject of investigation (e.g., De Dreu &
Boles, 1998). Social value orientation is a dimension anchored by those who
have an extremely competitive, winner take-all, individualistic orientation and
those who have an extremely cooperative, share-and-share-alike, prosocial
orientation. The former endorse statements such as "your loss is my gain,"
while the latter endorse statements such as "do unto others as you would have
them do unto you." Even some economists have observed that, in certain
contexts, a prosocial orientation may be more appropriate than a competitive
orientation. "In an ever more interdependent world, social cooperation has
become increasingly important," and perhaps economics education should
stress "a broader view of human motivation" than it may at present (Frank,
Gilovich & Regan, 1993, p. 170-171).
We believed that the issues raised by these studies are worth examining in a
Canadian context. Our first goal was to replicate and extend the Carter & Irons
(1991) and the Frank, Gilovich & Regan (1993) studies. We wanted to involve
participants from as many undergraduate programs as possible, so as to be
able to detect any specific differences between students taking different
majors. We hoped that such replications could be a productive source of
discussion about the educational values that are appropriate in the ‘new world
order’ (or disorder, as some would have it).
We were also interested in whether or not there would be differences between
our results with Canadian participants and those previously found with
American participants. These two societies, while similar in many respects,
are very different in other respects. Both Canadian society and the
governments it typically elects are usually considered to be politically to the left
of U.S. society and its governments. The social welfare system is more
extensive in Canada, and the government plays a more extensive role in the
economy. Due in part to these environmental differences, Canadian
participants may respond differently than their American counterparts.
A word of caution is in order concerning what follows. This is very much a work
in progress, and our results are only tentative. We hope to be able to provide a
much more extensive analysis when our study is completed.
2. REPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF CARTER & IRONS (1991)
There were a total of 28 participants who were given $2 for participating, and
who split $10 in each 2-person game. Participants were randomly assigned to
a two person simple ultimatum bargaining game. Before participating, the
logic of ultimatum bargaining games was thoroughly explained to each
participant. In this game, one person (the Proposer) suggested a division of
$10 between him/herself and a second person (the Responder). If the
Responder accepted the offer, then the $10 was divided accordingly. If the
responder rejected the proposal, then both participants got no more than the
$2 for participating. The role of proposer and responder were determined by a
coin toss.
Carter & Irons (1991) did not actually carry out the game just described.
Rather, they had their participants, who were undergraduates at a
Massachusetts university, imagine what they would propose and what they
would accept. We also did this with 20 of our 28 participants, after they had
completed the real game.
In the real games, a 5-5 split was proposed in all but two of 14 cases. The two
exceptions were a 7-3 and a 6-4 proposal, and only the latter led to a rejection
of the proposal. For the imaginary games, the mean amount that participants
proposed for themselves was 5.2 (SD = 1.4). This is the amount kept. The
corresponding value when playing the respondent role was 3.6 (SD = 1.4). This
is the amount acceptable. Thus on average, people said that they would
propose more for the respondent (4.8) than they would actually accept if they
were the respondent.
While we do not yet have enough data to make meaningful comparisons
between disciplines within our sample, we can compare our overall results with
those from the Carter & Irons (1991) study, as shown in the figure below.
Notice that the amount kept for the Canadian sample is lower than the
corresponding amount for the American sample (t=5.82, df=18, p < .001).
Moreover, Canadians have a higher amount acceptable than do the
Americans (t=4.56, df=19, p<.001). Both differences are statistically
significant, and serve to reinforce one stereotype of Canadian/American
differences. Canadians appear to conform less to the "winner take all"
stereotype. Canadians appear not only to want to share the proceeds more
equitably, but also to be unwilling to accept as little as Americans when they
are on the receiving end. However these data should be interpreted cautiously.
Notice that in our real games, the difference between the amount kept and the
amount accepted is even smaller than in the imaginary games. We do not have
the corresponding data for Carter & Irons (1991) American participants. It may
be that in real games, the American participants would have behaved in a less
polarized manner, and this could have influenced their subsequent imaginary
games.
3. REPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF FRANK, GILOVICH & REGAN
(1993)
Our second experiment replicated the Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) study
referred to above. There were 33 participants, each of whom were paid $2 for
participating and who participated in groups of 3. Each group member played
2 prisoner’s dilemma games, one against each other group member. Before
playing, the logic of prisoner’s dilemma games was thoroughly explained to
each participant. In this game, acting self-interestedly may lead to a higher
monetary payoff, or to a lower reward than would be the case if both players
cooperate. The payoff matrix (in dollars) for both players is given below.
 Player X
 Cooperate Defect
Player Y
Cooperate
2 for X
2 for Y
3 for X
0 for Y
Defect
0 for X
3 for Y
1 for X
1 for Y
After playing both games, participants were given a payoff that was
determined by the outcome of their games and by a random number that
increased or decreased their payoff such that they were not able to determine
with certainty the behavior of their opponents. This "random" factor was
explained to participants before the games began. Thus participants received
$2 plus whatever amount resulted from their games plus or minus a random
number.
We grouped our participants by discipline as follows. Eleven psychology and
child studies students were placed in one group (PSYC), 17 economics,
business and accounting students were placed in a second group (ECON),
and 6 students from other disciplines (e.g., fine arts, computer science) were
placed in a third group (OTHER). All participants were assigned a score of 1 if
they cooperated in a game and a score of 2 if they defected.
An analysis of variance showed that there were group differences in these
"defection scores," as shown in the figure below (F = 3.30, df = 2, 28, p = .05).
If one considers only the psychology and economics groups, the difference is
consistent with the results of Frank, Gilovich & Regan (1993): Economics
students defect more often than psychology students. However, when one adds
in the third group, the results are less clear cut. While the psychology students
defect less than the other two groups, there is no reliable difference between
the latter. Frank, Gilovich & Regan (1993) only compared economics students
with "others," and did not specify the majors of the comparison group. Our
results suggest that economics majors may well defect more than some
students, such as psychology majors. However, it may be more accurate to put
it this way: Psychology students defect less (are more cooperative) than
others, including economics majors.
Our results are even more complicated because of an interaction between
major and gender (F = 4.14, df = 1, 28, p = .05). The shape of this interaction is
shown in the figure below. Notice that women have identical defection scores
in both the psychology and economics groups. Unfortunately, we have as yet
no female representatives of the "other" group, a deficiency we intend to
remedy in due course. In our current data, the real effect of major is for men.
Men who are in psychology have the lowest defection score (i.e., are more
likely to cooperate). It is these men who are the most "different" in our current
sample. In answer to the question posed by our title, economists may or may
not be rational, but it is male psychologists who are different.
Others (e.g., Frank, Gilovich & Regan, 1993, p. 164) have observed that the
individualistic values promoted by the self-interest model of economics may
also be more characteristic of men, while women may be more attracted to
prosocial disciplines like psychology. However, when one examines this
distinction in more detail, it becomes clear that, like all stereotypes, it obscures
the uniqueness of particular cases. Men who choose to study psychology, and
women who choose to study economics, may prove to be interesting groups to
study further.
One final result may also be worth exploring further. On their response forms,
participants first indicated whether they would cooperate or defect in one
game with one of the other participants, and then whether they would
cooperate or defect in the game with the other participant. Let us call these
"Game 1" and "Game 2" respectively. Frank, Gilovich & Regan (1993) did not
examine this variable in their analyses, and so we do not know whether or not
the following effect existed in their data. In our data, it turns out that there is an
interaction between gender and game (F = 19.26, df = 1, 28, p < .001), which
is illustrated in the figure below. Notice that in Game 1 men and women
behave in a way that is consistent with their current stereotype. Women defect
less (cooperate more) and men defect more (cooperate less). However, this
tendency reverses itself in Game 2. It is as if once someone has decided to
defect (or cooperate) in Game 1, then it becomes OK to cooperate (or defect)
in game 2.
While our results admittedly require replication, it is an irresistible temptation to
speculate upon them nonetheless. Psychologists such as Gergen (1991) have
suggested that the postmodern self should not be seen as a unitary entity, but
rather as a multiplicity of "selves." In the context of our study, perhaps it is
unwise to see men and women, or economists and psychologists, as either
cooperative or competitive. Rather, it may be more accurate to see each
person as both cooperative and competitive. No doubt one part of oneself may
have the upper hand on most occasions, but that does not mean that the other
parts of oneself never find their voice. The men in our study tended to give
voice to the competitive part of themselves in the first instance, but, having
done so, allowed their cooperative self the opportunity to express itself. The
reverse scenario was enacted by the women in our study.
4. CONCLUSION
No doubt it is important to know with whom you are dealing, whether it be
economist, psychologist, or other. In general, the psychologist will tend to be
more cooperative, and the economist more competitive. However, it may be
equally important to know when you are dealing with them. If it is a man, and he
has just defeated the competition, then he may be quite happy to cooperate
with you. If it is a woman, and she has just reached a cooperative
accommodation with another, then it may be a bad time to try to strike bargain.
A person’s behavior is contextually determined, and relying on stereotypes to
make decisions is not a rational procedure.
At the end of the day, our study does not really reinforce previous studies that
have suggested that economics education is too narrowly focused on the self-
interest model. Perhaps it is, but the economics students in our sample are not
necessarily more selfish than other groups. Our studies have examined group
differences in more detail than have previous studies, and found as a result
that there is no simple story to tell about either economists or psychologists. In
this respect, we are reminded of the philosopher John Wisdom (1965: 138),
who once told the story of a (perhaps apocryphal) lion keeper at the Dublin Zoo
who was renowned for his success at keeping lions healthy under any and all
circumstances. He obviously had a deep understanding of lions. At the end of
a long and successful career he was asked to divulge the secret of his
success. He said that the most important thing was to realize that every lion is
different. Thus, a deep understanding of the members of one category (e.g.,
lions, economists or psychologists) does not mean that you know the same
thing about all of them. The beginning of wisdom for educators may be the
realization that, like lions, all economics students are different, as are all
psychology students, or, for that matter, all the members of any category.
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